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The Philokalia identifies the passions as a fundamental concern of the spiritual life, a concern which 
must be properly understood if the barrier that they present to progress towards the goal of human 
existence is to be effectively addressed. The exact nature and properties of the passions and the 
proper means of addressing and overcoming them are presented, as one would expect from forty or 
so authors writing over a span of more than a thousand years, in many and diverse ways. On a 
canvas of more or less consistent philosophical and theological assumptions about Christian 
anthropology, a rich variety of images, symbols, metaphors and allegories is used to paint a 
passionate picture of the human predicament and its solution. Amidst this plethora of images, is that 
of the compassionate physician treating the ailing human creature whose very life is drained by the 
multiplicity of wounds and diseases that comprise the passions. Although it might be stretching 
things too far to claim that this image is universal and consistent throughout the texts of the 
Philokalia, it would certainly seem to be an important image, amongst other images, and it is found 
in both the earliest and latest texts and in texts by all of the major contributors. 
 
What, then, is the nature of the pathology that the Philokalia diagnoses? Fundamentally, the 
passions are themselves, collectively and individually, understood as being a kind of disease, or 
sickness, of the soul. 
 
Thus: 
 In On the Eight Vices, John Cassian refers to unchastity, avarice, anger, dejection, and 
listlessness as sicknesses.i 
 Neilos, in his Ascetic Discourse, refers to sin as being like a protracted illness, and to the 
passions as causing a disease of the soul.ii 
 John of Karpathos, in For the Encouragement of the Monks in India who had Written to Him: 
One Hundred Texts, refers to the sicknesses of unbelief and despair, and of rebellion against 
God.iii 
 In On the Character of Men and on the Virtuous Life, attributed in the Philokalia to Antony 
the Great, the greatest sickness of the soul is said to be not knowing God, and Godlessness 
and love of praise are said to be “the worst and most incurable disease of the soul”.iv 
 Thalassios the Libyan, in On Love, Self-Control, and Life in Accordance with the Intellect, 
asserts that “The soul’s disease is an evil disposition”.v 
 Abba Philimon is quoted as saying that “Thoughts about vain things are sicknesses of an idle 
and sluggish soul”.vi 
 In On the Practice of the Virtues, Contemplation and the Priesthood, a text attributed in the 
Philokalia to Theognostos, reference is made to “the sickness of the passions”.vii 
 Ilias the Presbyter, in Part I of A Gnomic Anthology, contrasts the “hidden sickness”, “in the 
depths of consciousness” with the possibly healthy outward appearance of a soul.viii 
 Symeon Metaphrastis, in the Paraphrase of the Homilies of St Makarios of Egypt, refers to 
“the sickness of evil and ignorance”.ix 
 Nikitas Stithatos, in On the Inner Nature of Things and on the Purification of the Intellect, 
refers to sickness of the soul (or “psychic illness”) in a general sense and to lack of faith 
specifically as a disease of the soul.x 
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 Gregory Palamus, in To the Most Reverend Nun Xenia, distinguishes between passions which 
belong to human beings “by nature”, and therefore are good, and the misuse of these 
passions which provides evidence of sickness of the soul.xi 
 
These Philokalic references to sickness and disease show great diversity. However, they also show a 
more or less consistent understanding of the human condition as giving evidence of a kind of 
pathology of the soul. This evidence is closely associated with, if not actually identified with, the 
presence and activity of the passions. In fact, even if these explicit metaphors were not used, the 
account of the passions provided by the Philokalia would arguably invite the use of medical 
metaphors such as disease, sickness and illness. The passions are portrayed as causing pain and 
dysfunction in the spiritual life,xii as being contrary to nature,xiii and as leading to deathxiv if left 
untreated. 
 
The Philokalia also employs medical metaphors in respect of the treatment of the passions. Thus, 
medicines effective in treatment of the diseased soul include: 
 
 Anger (when properly used against evil thoughts)xv 
 Fear of Godxvi 
 Salvationxvii 
 Guarding the intellect (by remembrance of sins, mindfulness of death, meditation on the 
passion of Christ, and remembrance of blessings)xviii 
 Ascetic disciplinexix 
 Tearsxx 
 
More generally, healing of the soul is explicitly described as being brought about through meditation 
and prayer,xxi the compassion of God,xxii pain and suffering,xxiii the passion of Christ,xxiv wisdom,xxv and 
reproof.xxvi Specific remedies for specific passions include almsgiving for the healing of the soul’s 
incensive power,xxvii spiritual knowledge for the healing of mental dejection,xxviii humility for envy and 
self-conceit,xxix solitude for conceit and vanity.xxx But again the whole tenor of the Philokalia is one of 
the healing of the human condition, and even where this is implicit rather than explicit, or where 
other kinds of metaphors are used, it would still seem appropriate to understand the Philokalia as 
offering a kind of therapeutic repertoire, or pharmacopeia, for the treatment of the soul afflicted by 
the passions. Thus, ascetic discipline, prayer (including the Jesus prayer), psalmody, and guarding of 
the heart might all be understood as therapies for the soul. 
 
The aim of therapy, the healing of the soul, might at one level be understood as achieving 
dispassion. In this sense, the aim of Philokalic therapy can in many places appear very similar to that 
of Stoic philosophy, the elimination of the passions. But the Philokalia does not stop here, for its 
authors only understand dispassion as a means to a theological end, the goal of pure prayer, or 
union with God. Whilst the doctrine of deification was only definitively formulated by Gregory 
Palamus in the 14th Century, and is treated explicitly by relatively few authors of the Philokalia,xxxi 
nonetheless it is the case throughout the Philokalia that well-being is understood theologically, 
whether in terms of hesychia, illumination of the intellect, blessedness, pure prayer or openness to 
God, rather than purely psychologically or philosophically in terms of thoughts or ideas. 
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In the second century of Two Hundred Texts on Theology and the Incarnate Dispensation of the Son 
of God, Maximos the Confessor provides a more detailed account of the healing process: 
 
If you are healed of the breach caused by the fall, you are severed first from the passions 
and then from impassioned thoughts. Next you are severed from nature and the inner 
principles of nature, then from conceptual images and the knowledge relating to them. 
Lastly, when you have passed through the manifold principles relating to divine providence, 
you attain through unknowing the very principle of divine unity. Then the intellect 
contemplates only its own immutability, and rejoices with an unspeakable joy because it has 
received the peace of God which transcends all intellect and which ceaselessly keeps him 
who has been granted it from falling (cf. Phil. 4:7).xxxii 
This account of healing appears to reverse or undo the pathology of the passions that Maximos 
describes elsewhere.xxxiii Maximos seems to understand a process by which thoughts or images 
become impassioned by a kind of cathexis or attachment of a passion to a thought/image. In the 
healing process, this attachment is broken. But the healing process is more radical than this, for 
having uncouple thought processes from the passions it goes on to engage them in a contemplation 
of the “manifold principles relating to divine providence” and then, through a process of 
“unknowing”, to the divine unity itself. Here, there is a transcending of the intellect, a transcending 
of the multiplicity of thoughts, in the unity of God. 
If the Philokalia presents a school of therapy for the soul, designed to bring about its healing, it 
might well be argued that the Philokalia is a kind of manual for psychotherapy. However, once this 
word, “psychotherapy”, is coined, with all its more modern connotations of Freudian and post-
Freudian therapies designed to explore the unconscious, and of the cognitive-behavioural therapies 
based on cognitive and behavioural scientific psychology, we realise at once how the Philokalia is 
both similar to and radically different to what we now call, in the western world, psychotherapy. 
 
On the one hand, the Philokalia shares with contemporary psychotherapies a concern with 
“inwardness” and with self-reflective awareness, a suspicion about the motives that lay behind 
apparently innocent or well intentioned actions, and a keen attention to the content and processes 
of cognition. Even some of the methods look very similar – especially those that betray a Stoic model 
of the passions (or in the case of contemporary psychology the emotions) as fundamentally based 
upon thoughts (or cognition). For example, the identification of thoughts/judgements that lead to 
fear might be a concern of both the cognitive therapist and the disciple of the Philokalia,xxxiv 
remembrance of death is also effectively a cognitive strategy for changing patterns of thought, and 
ascetic discipline might be considered a kind of behavioural therapy orientated towards changing 
patterns of thought as well as lifestyle. Even the Philokalic injunctions to obedience and submission 
to an elder or spiritual guide find their parallels in the therapeutic relationship with a therapist who 
is seen as having greater wisdom, knowledge and experience in matters of the inner life. 
 
On the other hand, contemporary psychotherapies are based on very different theoretical 
frameworks and aim at very different ends. Whilst differences in theory might be surprisingly more 
superficial than they first appear, there are undoubtedly important differences. The Freudian tri-
partite model of the psyche as comprising id, ego and superego, for example, is not so very different 
to the Platonic model of appetitive, incensive and rational parts of the soul, a model which 
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influenced both Freud and the authors of the Philokalia. Or again, both the cognitive therapist and 
the authors of the Philokalia emphasise the importance of a self-reflective awareness of thought 
processes which will lead to greater understanding of how to identify aberrant patterns of thought 
and develop healthy ones. The scientific rationalism of the cognitive therapist is not necessarily so 
very far removed from the philosophical and contemplative reasoning of the Philokalic practitioner 
when consideration is limited only to matters of cognitive analysis. But when consideration is 
broadened to include ultimate concerns, the atheistic assumptions of Freud and the cognitive-
behaviourists contrast strongly with the Philokalic world of personal spiritual forces which draw the 
human creature inevitably towards, or away from, a telos which is firmly located in the Divine. 
Moreover, the end of human beings in relationship with God involves the authors of the Philokalia in 
a contemplative “unknowing” which ultimately transcends human rational thought. This 
transcendence is completely lacking, at least from Freud and the more scientific cognitive-
behavioural schools of therapy, if not from all of the schools of therapy which have emerged since 
the work of pioneers such as Freud, Skinner and Ellis. 
 
Differences are perhaps nowhere more apparent, however, than in the accounts that are given in 
the secular psychotherapies and in the Philokalia of the relationship of suffering to therapy and the 
healing process. In order to give this comparison more careful consideration, it will be necessary first 
to say a little more about what the goals of the secular psychotherapies are. 
 
Jerome Frank has suggested that: 
 
The goal of all forms of psychotherapy is to enable a person to satisfy his legitimate needs 
for affection, recognition, and sense of mastery through helping him to correct the 
maladaptive attitudes, emotions, and behaviour that impede the attainment of such 
satisfactions. In so doing, psychotherapy seeks to improve his social interactions and reduce 
his distress, while at the same time helping him to accept the suffering that is an inevitable 
aspect of life and, when possible, to utilize it in the service of personal growth.xxxv 
 
Whilst psychotherapy seeks to reduce distress, it also recognises that suffering is an inevitable 
aspect of life and that acceptance of suffering that cannot be relieved will be an important goal of 
therapy, alongside reduction where it can. Where possible, however, a higher goal is hinted at, the 
goal of “personal growth”, a goal towards which the acceptance of inevitable suffering may take the 
patient closer. The exact form that this personal growth might take is not specified, although it 
would appear to have something to do with the enabling of satisfaction of personal needs and the 
achieving of a “sense of mastery”. Exactly how these goals might be achieved will vary from one 
form of therapy to another.xxxvi  
 
Although there is not space here to survey exactly how personal growth is understood in all the 
different kinds of psychotherapy, Carl Rogers has provided an account which might be considered 
typical of many, albeit not all: 
 
… the individual becomes more integrated, more effective. He shows fewer of the 
characteristics which are usually termed neurotic or psychotic, and more of the 
characteristics of the healthy, well-functioning person. He changes his perception of himself, 
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becoming more realistic in his views of self. He becomes more like the person he wishes to 
be. He values himself more highly. He is more self-confident and self-directing. He has a 
better understanding of himself, becomes more open to his experience, denies or represses 
less of his experience. He becomes more accepting in his attitudes toward others, seeing 
others as more similar to himself. 
 
In his behaviour he shows similar changes. He is less frustrated by stress, and recovers from 
stress more quickly. He becomes more mature in his everyday behaviour as this is observed 
by friends. He is less defensive, more adaptive, more able to meet situations creatively.xxxvii 
 
For Rogers, this growth takes place when a troubled, conflicted person is provided with a certain 
type of relationship, one which is characterised by genuineness, acceptance and empathy.xxxviii 
However, in other forms of psychotherapy it might be facilitated by resolution of inner conflicts, 
symptom reduction, or modification of patterns of thought. What would seem to be the common 
thread is that psychotherapy aims to reduce distress and suffering where possible, to enable 
acceptance of and adaptation to stresses that cannot be changed, and to achieve a greater sense of 
self confidence and self mastery which is concerned with the satisfaction of personal needs, 
including the need for harmonious and mutually fulfilling interactions with others. 
 
We may again note that there is much common ground here with the model of therapy that is 
presented in the Philokalia. The Philokalia is also concerned with the correction of maladaptive 
attitudes, emotions (or passions), and behaviours. The Philokalia is concerned with acceptance of 
suffering, improved social interactions, and personal growth. It is concerned with self awareness and 
realism about self and experience of the world. At least insofar as ascetic discipline is a form of self-
control, it is also concerned with self mastery. However, alongside these parallel concerns, we must 
also note that the Philokalia is an anthology of texts concerned with the life of prayer and that its 
ultimate goal is one of deification, or union with God. This central theological preoccupation, and its 
recognition of the need for the grace of God in order to achieve it, renders its school of therapy 
radically different to secular psychotherapy. If the psychotherapies are, by and large, “talking cures”, 
the Philokalia offers a “praying cure”. If the former aim to increase self confidence, the latter aim to 
increase confidence in God: 
 
Humility consists in constant prayer combined with tears and suffering. For this ceaseless 
calling upon God for help prevents us from foolishly growing confident in our own strength 
and wisdom, and from putting ourselves above others. These are dangerous diseases of the 
passion of pride.xxxix 
 
This difference is brought out when we consider how suffering is dealt with differently in 
psychotherapy and in the Philokalia. Whilst suffering might constitute the reason for seeking 
psychotherapy, and its reduction and management might constitute the therapeutic objectives of 
psychotherapy, in the Philokalia we find that it is fundamentally a part of therapy. This becomes 
especially clear in the works of Maximos the Confessor, the second largest single contributor to the 
Philokalia, although it is by no means confined to these texts. 
 
7 
 
For Maximos, the healing process is facilitated primarily by the suffering of Christ in his passion, but 
necessarily also by the willing participation of human beings in this suffering. Thus, for example, in 
the fourth century of Four Hundred Texts on Love, he writes: 
 
The aim of divine providence is to unite by means of true faith and spiritual love those 
separated in various ways by vice. Indeed, the Saviour endured His sufferings so that ‘He 
should gather together into one the scattered children of God’ (John 11: 52). Thus, he who 
does not resolutely bear trouble, endure affliction, and patiently sustain hardship, has 
strayed from the path of divine love and from the purpose of providence.xl 
 
Elsewhere, in the first century of Two hundred texts on theology and the incarnate dispensation of 
the Son of God, Written for Thalassios, Maximos associates a process of suffering which “purifies 
those practicing the virtues”, and which then leads on to contemplation, dispassion and deification, 
with a Christological model of the appearance of Christ in human and then transfigured forms.xli 
Human suffering thus presents both a healing opportunity to share in the human suffering of Christ, 
and also a healing path by which to progress to contemplative prayer, dispassion and ultimately 
deification.xlii 
 
Maximos clearly does not see suffering as the only prescription administered by the Divine Physician 
of Souls.xliii The efficacy of the treatment is also dependent upon human compliance.xliv Neither is 
specific suffering deliberately brought about by God with the purpose of imposing treatment. 
Maximos refers to suffering as caused by human sin,xlv misfortune,xlvi the devil,xlvii and the 
passions.xlviii It is the fool who regards either God or other human beings as responsible, says 
Maximos.xlix However, in the fourth century of Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and 
Virtue and Vice,l Maximos differentiates between two kinds of suffering. The one kind is a part of a 
“pleasure-pain syndrome”, where pain in the soul results from pleasure in the senses. This pain, 
associated with indulgence of the passions, was introduced by Adam, through the fall. The other 
kind of suffering, which brings about healing of this syndrome, is a pain in the senses which is 
associated with pleasure in the soul. This is the suffering which is associated with pursuit of virtue, 
and which was introduced into the world through the incarnation of Christ. Thus, Maximos writes: 
 
For through His passion He conferred dispassion, through suffering repose, and through 
death eternal life. By His privations in the flesh He re-established and renewed the human 
state, and by His own incarnation He bestowed on human nature the supranatural grace of 
deification.li 
 
According to Maximos, then, the suffering associated with the human condition is intimately tied up 
with the pleasure associated with the passions. If the passions are pleasurable, they are also 
noxious, or hostile.lii The healing of this suffering is brought about through a Christological therapy 
which is both concerned with the sharing of Christ in human suffering, freely chosen, and also with 
human sharing in the suffering of Christ, also freely chosen for love of him. 
 
As noted above, the repertoire of therapies offered in the Philokalia is much broader than this 
Maximian perspective on participation in Christ’s suffering alone might imply. It includes, for 
example, obedience and spiritual discipline, remembrance of death, psalmody, watchfulness and 
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prayer. However, in every therapeutic modality the Philokalia has its points of radical difference 
from contemporary secular psychotherapy. These differences are most obviously and pervasively 
theological, finding their justification in scripture, doctrine and Christian tradition rather than in any 
anthropocentric outcomes, understanding a dependence upon the grace of God rather than the 
activities of human beings as essential for the process of healing, and finding a Divine telos as the 
only ultimately important goal of healing. 
 
In the example just examined, of the Maximian understanding of the therapeutic role of suffering, 
the difference from secular psychotherapies is not only theological but is also strikingly 
Christological. A Christological element to the therapy of the Philokalia may be identified more 
widely, as for example in the use of the Jesus prayer, or the significance of the transfiguration of 
Christ for understanding the illumination of the intellect.liii Even where it is not explicit, there is 
arguably always an implicit Christology lurking in the background, as for example in the case of the 
temptation of Christ in the wilderness as a model for ascetic discipline.liv 
 
The Philokalia is also personal in a way that the contemporary psychotherapies are not. It is true that 
the Philokalic importance of the personal relationship of the Christian disciple with a spiritual father 
finds its parallel in the significance accorded to the therapeutic relationship between patient and 
therapist in virtually all psychotherapies. Similarly, relationships with other human beings are 
important for the growth of Christian virtue in the Philokalia, and for understanding and healing 
dysfunctional relationships in psychotherapy. However, the world of the Philokalia is rich with other 
personal and spiritual beings with whom the disciple is also in relationship, including both angels and 
demons as well as, most importantly, God himself. An instructive example here might be found in 
the growing popularity of the practice of mindfulness in secular psychotherapy. 
 
Mindfulness, in this context, has its origins in the traditions of Buddhism.lv It is not easily defined, 
and is susceptible of varying definitions, but it is “to pay attention in a particular way”.lvi The 
attention is generally understood to be focussed on present experience, and often also implies a 
degree of acceptance of this experience, however difficult that may be. It is sometimes also 
associated with a degree of ineffability. It is now seen as having an evidence based role in a variety 
of forms of psychotherapy from dynamic to cognitive-behavioural, and finds a place in stress 
management as well as in the treatment of anxiety and mood disorders, addiction and even 
psychosis. The common features of mindfulness and hesychia, or stillness, as understood in the 
Philokalia are immediately apparent. For example, both are associated with bodily discipline and 
avoidance of distractions,lvii and both are associated with a degree of ineffability. However, as the 
authors of the English translation of the Philokalia make clear in their glossary, hesychia is 
fundamentally a state of relationship with God – of listening or being open to God.lviii Where the 
English word “mindfulness” appears in the translation of the Philokalia, it usually refers explicitly to 
mindfulness of God.lix 
 
Whilst mindfulness as employed in secular psychotherapy has some important commonalities with 
hesychia and mindfulness in the Philokalia, they may be distinguished both by the theological 
context and, importantly, also the greater personal and interpersonal nature of Christian hesychia as 
contrasted with the more impersonal and intrapersonal nature of Buddhist/secular mindfulness. In 
hesychia, the Christian is drawn towards a relationship with God in Christ. In mindfulness, the 
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Buddhist is in a more or less impersonal state of attentive awareness. These differences reflect the 
theological contrast between the Christian understanding of the contingency of creation upon a 
personal creator, and the Buddhist understandings of impermanence of all things and in particular of 
“non self”, or absence of any enduring entity such as self or soul. 
 
The differences between the Philokalia and secular psychotherapies, about which much more could 
doubtless be said than space allows for here, might be summarised as being the difference between 
what is essentially a “talking cure” and that which is essentially a “praying cure”. The former is 
anthropocentric. The latter is pervasively theocentric and specifically Christocentric.  
 
What, then, are the implications of the Philokalia for the Christian understanding of healing, and for 
the practice of psychotherapy? 
 
1. Christian healing is a fundamentally theocentric and Christological process which does not 
necessarily imply freedom from suffering, or even reduction of suffering, in human terms. 
However, it does understand a therapeutic process whereby suffering itself becomes a part 
of the healing process. As Maximos would have it, the passion of Christ becomes a means of 
the healing of human passions. 
2. The passions are “hostile pleasures”. They reflect a distraction from Divine purpose, a 
drawing into relationships with things and people which are superficially rewarding but 
ultimately a cause of human suffering. To try to find a balm for human suffering amidst the 
pleasures of wealth, sexual indulgence or self-satisfaction is therefore somewhat like trying 
to put out a fire with petrol! 
3. Psychotherapy is concerned with psychological processes, with thoughts, emotions and 
passions, whether viewed from a secular perspective or through the lens of the Philokalia. 
However, secular psychotherapies are concerned primarily with the improvement of 
psychological wellbeing, whereas the Philokalia is concerned primarily with spiritual 
wellbeing understood in a personal and Christocentric way. The Philokalia keeps a positive 
perspective about the ultimate goals around which most secular psychotherapies either 
prefer to remain silent or else are nihilistic. 
4. Although the therapy offered by the Philokalia is not primarily concerned with reducing 
psychological suffering, this does not imply that the reduction of psychological suffering 
might not be achieved by application of the therapy that the Philokalia prescribes. Similarly, 
at least in certain circumstances or on some occasions, secular therapies might usefully and 
legitimately be appropriated by Christians to this end. Indeed one might imagine that 
Christian love will always be concerned to bring such relief where possible. The warning that 
the Philokalia offers is that this relief should not be the final end of therapy, or one that is 
pursued to the ultimate harm of the person concerned. 
5. If secular psychotherapy is a “talking cure”, then the Philokalia offers a “praying cure”. 
Prayer, understood as relationship with the Divine, leading eventually to union with God, is 
both the means and end of the therapy that the Philokalia prescribes. 
 
It is interesting that counselling and psychotherapy are increasingly open to consideration of a 
spiritual dimension of human well-being, and yet that the possibility of prayer within the context of a 
therapeutic relationship seems to be increasingly controversial.lx Whilst the concept of spirituality is 
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elastic enough to accommodate widely varying ideas of what the spiritual goals of therapy should 
be, prayer is an inescapably theistic and personal encounter. The Philokalia was published at a time 
when the European enlightenment was challenging not only ideas of whether and how God might be 
known, but even the extent to which anything at all can confidently be known by the human subject. 
Whilst it arises from an eastern context within which such concerns were hardly voiced at all, or 
even completely unknown, yet its self-reflective approach to the need to question and interpret 
human thoughts, and ultimately to find transcendence beyond them, works remarkably well as a 
means of seeking healing in our present age. 
 
The present secular age, within which we live,lxi is inward looking and radically reflexive if also at 
times surprisingly naïve about the goodness that it expects to find within the human self. To this 
context, the Philokalia brings a means of being self reflective which is both critical and realistic, 
aware of immanence and transcendence, psychologically sophisticated and yet spiritually directed. 
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